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INTRODUCTION 
 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) is a uniform law that 
serves as a guide for states to use when drafting their own respective 
trade secret legislation.1  Because the UTSA is merely a guide, even 
after its enactment, state legislatures were, and still are, free to choose 
which sections of the UTSA to adopt within their respective states.2  As 
a result, some states have adopted the UTSA as written, while others 
have made alterations by leaving some sections out.  In general, seven 
states adopted the original 1979 version of the UTSA immediately upon 
enactment, and thirty-nine states and the U.S. Virgin Islands adopted 
the UTSA with the 1985 amendments.3  Additionally, both the New 
York and New Jersey legislatures are considering whether to adopt 
pending versions of the UTSA.4  In general, the UTSA has been widely 
adopted. 
In spite of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws’ (“NCCUSL”) best attempt to (1) promote even 
development of trade secret law, and (2) relieve the uncertainty 
surrounding trade secret protection, ambiguity and uncertainty persist 
within trade secret law.  More specifically, judicial disputes regarding 
what exactly constitutes a trade secret and how to protect confidential 
information that does not quite rise to the level of a trade secret have 
arisen within the context of employer-employee relationships.5  Several 
courts throughout the country have held that the UTSA does not 
abrogate all other civil remedies based on the misappropriation of 
confidential information if a court deems that the information is not a 
trade secret.6  In other words, some courts have held that an employer 
1. See 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 3 (2006). 
2. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Trade Secrets - The New Risks to Trade Secrets 
Posed by Computerization, 28 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 227, 233 (2002); Breana C. 
Smith et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 663, 671 (2006). 
3. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the . . . Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2008). 
4. A.B. 2296, 229th Legis., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); A.B. 2352, 212th Legis., 1st  Sess. 
(N.J. 2006). 
5. See, e.g., Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2006). 
6. See, Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 792-93; Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. P'ship v. 
Airtek, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (to the extent to which materials did not 
constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could continue a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. 
v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658-59 (E.D. Va. 2002) (alternate 
claims, not based on trade secret information could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F. 
Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (only those claims that rely entirely on a trade secret 
should be abrogated). 
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may only bring a claim under the UTSA for the misappropriation of 
information legally defined as a trade secret.  As a result of this 
interpretation of the UTSA, businesses are free to bring a variety of 
other civil tort claims for the misappropriation of information that falls 
just short of trade secret status.  Other courts, however, have held that 
the UTSA does abrogate other civil tort remedies based on the misuse 
of confidential information deemed not to be a trade secret.7  As a result 
of these conflicting judicial opinions, the type of information that 
departing employees are free to use is unclear.  Consequently, the result 
of these conflicting interpretations of the UTSA may have a detrimental 
effect on employees, employers, and even competing businesses. 
In general, then, courts and legislatures need to determine whether 
the UTSA should allow, under its umbrella, “a claim that a defendant 
has misused commercial information that is not a trade secret.”8  This 
question may seem to be of little consequence in practice; however, as 
Attorney Tait Graves points out in his analysis of California trade secret 
and tort law, there are significant public policy implications resulting 
from this interpretation of the UTSA.9  If the UTSA abrogates other 
tort claims for the misappropriation of information deemed not to be a 
trade secret, employees will be afforded much greater protection 
because claims for such misappropriation would be limited to only those 
claims allowed under the UTSA.10  This interpretation of the UTSA 
would also further the overall public policy supporting a mobile 
workforce by preventing departing employees from being overly 
concerned about using marginally confidential information or 
information deemed to be general knowledge.11
In general, “the degree to which individuals and [competing] 
businesses . . . are free to use information that does not qualify as a 
trade secret”12 should be scrutinized to eliminate the ambiguity that 
currently exists.  In the future, courts should seek to create a “beneficial 
balance between innovation and competition” by affording protection 
to confidential information held to be of significant value to companies 
7. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 792-93 (recognizing that courts from other jurisdictions 
have abrogated all claims for the misappropriation of confidential information). 
8. See Tait Graves, Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law:  A Proposal for 
Harmonizing California’s Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes Under the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 1 (2006). 
9. Id. ¶ 2. 
10. See id. 
11. See id. 
12. Id. 
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and businesses, even if the information does not rise to the level of a 
trade secret.13  The law in this area should work towards “minimiz[ing] 
the incentives to obtain competitively valuable information through 
corrupt practices, rather than through independent effort.”14
Thus, in general, this Comment will examine which interpretation of 
the UTSA, as interpreted and adopted by the states, is more consistent 
with the public policy underlying the UTSA.  Part I discusses the history 
and development of trade secret law to depict how the law developed as 
it exists today.  Next, Part II explains how different courts have 
interpreted the UTSA’s abrogation clause in fact patterns involving 
three different types of confidential information.  Part III explains the 
competing interests that underlie the public policy supporting trade 
secret law and the protection of confidential information.  Finally, Part 
IV discusses the policy reasons behind protecting information that is 
confidential, but does not rise to the level of a trade secret, and goes on 
to discuss which interpretation of the UTSA best comports with the 
public policy of the UTSA and the interests of businesses and 
employees. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE SECRET LAW 
A.  Sources of Trade Secret Law 
“American courts have granted protection for trade secrets against 
their misuse or unauthorized disclosure for over one-hundred years.”15  
For decades, scholars have known that protecting trade secrets is 
important in order for businesses to remain “technologically 
competitive.”16  In spite of the murky common law and statutory 
remedies for trade secret misappropriation, industries continue to rely 
on trade secret protection.17  In the late 1960s, the Patent Law Section of 
the American Bar Association discussed a resolution favoring the 
13. Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap:  Protecting “Confidential 
Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 850-52 
(1998).  Because the exchange of information is such an important component in the process 
of improving upon current technology and innovation, precluding the unauthorized transfer 
of all useful data and knowledge would prevent innovation from occurring.  Id. at 849-50 
(emphasis added). 
14. Id. at 846. 
15. 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 1 (footnotes omitted). 
16. Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets:  The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. 
REV. 378, 378 (1971). 
17. See id. at 380-81. 
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enactment of a uniform state law that protected against the 
misappropriation of trade secrets or other confidential information.18  
As a result, the NCCUSL drafted the UTSA, which was finally adopted 
in 1979.19  The drafters at the NCCUSL were motivated to draft the 
UTSA for a number of reasons.  First, the drafters understood how 
important trade secret law was in promoting and maintaining interstate 
business.20  Second, the drafters realized that trade secret law had not 
“developed satisfactorily.”21  The drafters noted that trade secret law 
had developed unevenly and, as a result, there was “undue uncertainty 
concerning the parameters of trade secret protection.”22
The NCCUSL also recognized, when drafting the UTSA, that “[i]n 
view of the substantial number of patents that are invalidated by the 
courts, many businesses now elect to protect commercially valuable 
information . . . [via] the state law of trade secret protection.”23  
Furthermore, trade secret protection is more important now because 
there has been “unprecedented . . . growth in the computer, biotechnical 
and communications industries.”24
Early trade secret law initially developed from the common law; 
and, today, the law of trade secrets has further developed from both the 
Restatement of Torts as well as from Congress’ enactment of the 
UTSA.25  The Restatement describes a trade secret as “any formula, 
pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in one’s 
business, and which gives [the holder] an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”26  In previous 
cases, courts have protected a variety of information, including 
“nontechnological business information,” which is likely at issue in the 
majority of cases between employers and former employees.27
18. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531-32 
(1979). 
19. See id. at 532. 
20. See id. at 530-31. 
21. Id. at 531. 
22. See id. 
23. Id. at 530.  The Commission determined this based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), which held “neither the 
Patent Clause of the United States Constitution nor the federal patent laws pre-empt state 
trade secret protection for patentable or unpatentable information.”  Id. 
24. 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 1. 
25. Id. at 619, § 4. 
26. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
27. 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 6 (2006). 
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Next, according to the Restatement, the information must be secret 
and cannot be a matter of general knowledge.28  Any information must 
also be somewhat novel.29  Finally, information deemed to be a trade 
secret must be “used for business purposes and must provide a 
competitive advantage to the owner of the trade secret.  Thus, it must be 
of value to the holder.”30  Under the Restatement, trade secret 
infringement occurs when one not normally privy to the trade secret 
improperly takes and discloses it.31
After the 1985 amendments to the UTSA, the UTSA defined a trade 
secret as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process.”32  That “information” 
must “derive[] independent economic value . . . from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, 
and is the subject of efforts that . . . maintain its secrecy.”33  State trade 
secret statutes, as adopted from the UTSA, typically follow the UTSA 
by defining what a trade secret is and what constitutes 
misappropriation.34  In addition, these statues describe the damages 
allowed for misappropriation and that employers must take reasonable 
steps to protect their company’s trade secrets.35  Finally, the statute 
describes its effect on other laws.36  The UTSA “creates a claim for 
damages and injunctive relief for misappropriation of trade secrets.”37  
The statutes also focus on criminal sanctions and all states have criminal 
penalties for the misappropriation of trade secrets.38  However, in spite 
of such attempts to codify and clarify the law of trade secrets, much 
confusion still exists.39
28. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
29. 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 619, § 6 (2006).  This could also include information 
or any idea not generally known in the trade secret owner’s trade or business. 
30. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).  Liability for infringement of 
information deemed to be a trade secret is not determined merely by using or copying the 
information.  Instead, the use of “improper means” to obtain the trade secret is the basis of 
liability under the Restatement.  See id. 
32. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (1979). 
33. Id. § 1(4). 
34. See e.g., WIS. STAT. § 134.90(1)(c), (2) (2003-04). 
35. See id. § 134.90(1)(c), (2), (4). 
36. See id. § 134.90(6). 
37. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 671. 
38. Id. at 665. 
39. See Michael L. Rustad, Symposium Review:  The Negligent Enablement of Trade 
  
2008]   TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 365 
 
 
B.  Classification of Confidential Information 
 To be afforded trade secret protection, the information at issue 
must satisfy the definition set forth by the UTSA.  Though the 
definition is somewhat broad, it is often applied rigidly, leaving some 
valuable confidential information unprotected.40  Though an exact 
definition of a trade secret is somewhat elusive,41 trade secret scholars 
have accepted the fact that there is some information that should be 
protected that does not rise to the level of a trade secret.42  Further, the 
UTSA does not explicitly provide alternative remedies for those 
borderline pieces of information not classified as trade secrets, but that 
exist as confidential business or industry information not readily known 
to all.  However, section seven of the UTSA also does not explicitly 
abrogate claims for misappropriation of information deemed not to be a 
trade secret.43  Therefore, section seven merely creates confusion 
regarding the available claims for misappropriation of all other 
confidential information that does not rise to the level of a trade secret. 
Before the introduction of the UTSA, the common law defined a 
trade secret as “an idea not generally known and treated by the owner 
as a secret.”44  Today, however, a variety of factors contribute to the 
uncertainty surrounding what rises to the level of a trade secret and 
what merely constitutes confidential information.  Legal scholars and 
practitioners alike have attempted to define what constitutes 
confidential information and the level, if any, of protection of that 
information.45  Robert Unikel, a trade secret practitioner, suggested 
adopting Robert Milgrim’s hierarchical approach to defining trade 
secrets.46  This approach involves “classify[ing] the various types of 
Secret Misappropriation, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455, 516-17 
(2006). 
40. For the definition of a trade secret under the UTSA, see supra Part I.A. 
41. See Rustad, supra note 39, at 506-07. 
42. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 844 (explaining that there is confidential information 
that does not technically rise to the level of a trade secret yet continues to be valuable within 
an industry). 
43. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (1979). 
44. Comment, supra note 16, at 381. 
45. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 868-75.  After discussing throughout his article how 
trade secret scholars, such as Robert Milgrim, have recommended that courts, legislator, 
litigants, or whomever work to create a more useable method of protecting both trade secrets 
and confidential information, the author concludes that law-making bodies must “recognize 
and account for the existence of different types and levels of competitively significant 
knowledge.”  Id. at 890. 
46. See id. at 844. 
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technical data and business knowledge that companies and their 
employees may possess.”47  According to this approach, there are three 
hierarchical categories of business information: 
 
1. information that is known to substantially all 
persons in a particular field or industry . . . ; 
2. information that is known to a majority, but 
unknown to a minority, of persons in a particular 
field or industry; and . . . 
3. information that is known to a minority, but 
unknown to the majority, of persons in a 
particular field or industry.48 
 
Not all three categories should necessarily be afforded protection 
under the UTSA or some other common law protection mechanism 
because, for example, information readily known to a relative large 
group of people already minimizes the incentives to obtain this 
information in a corrupt manner.49  The first category of information, 
information that is known to substantially all in a given field or industry, 
should not receive any legal protection.50  Because this category of 
information is known, protecting this information would not serve the 
court’s purpose of balancing innovation and competition.  Further, 
protecting this type of information would unnecessarily restrict an 
employee’s mobility—that is, if an employee could not share this type of 
information in his new job, he would be unduly restricted in those 
positions he could accept.51
The second category of information, information that is known to a 
majority, but unknown to a minority of persons in a particular field or 
47. Id. 
48. Id.  As made apparent from these categorical designations, the designations are not 
necessarily based on the type of information at issue, but instead these categories are based 
on the degree to which others in a particular field or industry know or are aware of the 
information.  Classifying information based on the particular nature of the information 
would, I think, prove to ask too much of the courts.  As technology expands and new forms of 
information are developed, trying to define newly developed technology and information 
would be too cumbersome and would lead to inconsistencies among the courts. 
49. See id. at 850.  For years, other tort claims were used to hold departing employees 
responsible for misappropriation of confidential information not rising to the level of a trade 
secret.  See Graves, supra note 8, ¶¶ 45-46.  Those claims include unfair competition, breach 
of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, and tortious interference, among others.  Id. ¶¶ 47-52. 
50. Unikel, supra note 13, at 850-51. 
51. See id. at 850. 
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industry, highlights the elusive problem that exists in trade secret law.52  
This type of information has an overall lower “competitive value” than 
that information known to only a minority of people.53  As a result, this 
type of information should be afforded only some legal protection.54
Finally, the third category of information, which includes 
information that is known to a minority, but unknown to the majority, 
of persons in a particular field or industry, should receive the highest 
level of legal protection.55  This type of information deserves the most 
stringent level of protection because there is a great deal of motivation 
for a competitor to use improper means to obtain this type of 
information.  Though this framework has not been incorporated into the 
UTSA, it is likely the most effective approach for defining confidential 
information that does not rise to the level of trade secret status.56  Also, 
some information from categories two and three might, arguably, even 
rise to the level of trade secret status.  Therefore, this categorical 
approach might prove to be a more effective and realistic method of 
“defining” information that deserves protection. 
II.  HOW COURTS HAVE DETERMINED WHETHER THE UTSA 
ABROGATES CLAIMS 
 Section seven of the UTSA states the UTSA’s effect on other law 
with respect to information deemed to be a trade secret.  The drafters 
explicitly abrogate other civil remedies based on misappropriation of a 
defined trade secret and, among the courts, there seems to be little 
dispute that the UTSA did, in fact, intend to abrogate other civil 
remedies when a claim involves misappropriation of trade secrets.57  
However, the language of the UTSA makes it less clear whether section 
52. See id. at 852-54. 
53. Id. at 852-53. 
54. Id. at 853-54.  Providing some level of legal protection for this type of information 
works to protect, to a seemingly fair degree, information that is already known by some 
competitors, but not others.  Further, providing some protection for this type of information 
would not too severely limit employee mobility, because departing employees would be able 
to readily move among employers who already have possession of this type of information.  
Therefore, these employees would only be restricted from working for and disclosing 
information to those competitors who do not yet have this information.  Id. at 853-54. 
55. Id. at 851-52. 
56. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 890.  In his conclusion, the author argues that this 
“layered approach to the problem of information protection” is the most effective method of 
developing a satisfactorily “malleable, yet well-defined legal regime” that can provide the 
stability that seems so necessary in this confusing area of law.  Id. 
57. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (1979). 
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seven, and its state-adopted equivalents, abrogates other civil remedies 
based upon the misappropriation of confidential information that does 
not rise to the level of a trade secret.58  Sections 7(b)(1) and (2) state 
that the UTSA does not affect: “(1) contractual remedies, whether or 
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or (2) other civil 
remedies that are not based upon the misappropriation of a trade 
secret.”59
 In spite of the NCCUSL’s best attempt to clarify the state of 
trade secret law as it exists today, state courts across the country have 
interpreted section seven’s declaration of the UTSA’s effect on other 
laws in different ways.60  As a result, the question still exists as to how to 
interpret the UTSA with respect to information that does not rise to the 
level of a trade secret, but is still confidential information deemed 
worthy of some legal protection.61  This type of information would 
include that information described in categories two and three in Part 
II.62
Currently, the reigning case law that interprets section seven of the 
UTSA can be divided into three categories based on the legal claims 
and type of information at issue:63  (1) “when the claims are based only 
on the misuse of confidential information that satisfies the statutory 
definition of a trade secret,” most courts agree that a claim under the 
UTSA is the only tort claim available; (2) “when the claims are based on 
the misuse of confidential information that does not meet the statutory 
definition of a trade secret,” courts are divided on whether “the UTSA 
abrogates those claims”; and (3) “when the claims are based on misuse 
of confidential information, some of which meet the statutory definition 
of a trade secret and some of which do not,” courts, again, are divided as 
to whether the UTSA abrogates claims only to the extent that they are 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 792-93 (Wis. 
2006). 
61. See supra Part I. 
62. See supra Part I.B. 
63. See Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 792-93.  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin provided a 
particularly helpful analysis of the state of the law as it exists today.  Though the court was 
construing Wisconsin’s interpretation of the UTSA, it looked to other states’ decisions to 
determine how best to interpret the Wisconsin statute, which was adopted from the UTSA 
after the 1985 amendment.  In addition to making uniform laws, the adoption of the UTSA 
by the majority of states has made it easier for courts to turn to the case law in other 
jurisdictions to help interpret a current legal claim falling either under or just outside the 
scope of the UTSA.  See id. 
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based on a trade secret, and allows separate claims based on other 
factual allegations such as the misappropriation of confidential 
information.64  To fully understand the points of distinction between 
these three types of cases, examples of each category, each from a 
different state, follow in the discussion below. 
A.  Category One Analysis 
 In the first category of cases, the plaintiffs base their claims “only 
on the misuse of confidential information that fits the statutory 
definition of a trade secret.”65  In these cases, most state courts agree 
that a claim under the UTSA is the only tort claim available to the 
plaintiffs.66  In other words, plaintiffs cannot bring claims such as unjust 
enrichment or unfair competition when seeking relief.67  It is important 
to note, however, that breach of contract claims may still survive.68
One example of this type of case is R.K. Enterprise L.L.C. v. Pro-
Comp Management, Inc.69 where the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
concluded that the information at issue in the case fell under the 
statutory definition of a trade secret.70  In the case, Pro-Comp 
Management, among other affiliates, was doing business as The Right 
Solution (“TRS”).71  TRS was a nurse-staffing service that provided 
travel nurses to facilities in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and adjacent states.72  
Katherine Hefley was the manager of one of TRS’s offices and Mary 
Burks was an employee of TRS.73  Both Hefley and Burks resigned from 
TRS and began working for R.K. Enterprise, a company that provided 
travel nurses under the name of Nationwide Nurses (“Nationwide”).74  
A third employee, Traca Lane, fired by TRS, also began working for 
Nationwide.75
64. See id. at 792. 
65. Id. at 792-93. 
66. Id. 
67. See id. at 793 n.10. 
68. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (1979). 
69. See generally R.K. Enterprise L.L.C. v. Pro-Comp Management, Inc., 158 S.W.3d 
685 (Ark. 2004). 
70. Id. at 688. 
71. Id. at 686. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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 While employed with TRS, Hefley, Burks, and Lane had access to 
confidential information and each of them signed confidentiality and 
non-compete agreements.76  Eventually, TRS determined that the three 
former employees had removed original documents from employee 
files, other files containing personal information about the employees 
and tests that TRS used when hiring new nurses.77  Initially, TRS filed 
theft of property claims under the criminal statutes, but it later 
dismissed those charges.78
Later, TRS amended its complaint against all three former 
employees alleging “fraud, breach of non-competition and 
confidentiality agreement, misappropriation of trade secrets in violation 
of Arkansas Theft of Trade Secrets Act79 [(“Trade Secrets Act”)], 
conversion, and civil conspiracy.”80  The trial court found that the 
former employees had misappropriated trade secrets in violation of the 
Trade Secrets Act and required TRS to decide whether to seek recovery 
under the Trade Secrets Act or to “seek recovery for the 
misappropriation of trade secrets on the basis of tort claims of 
conversion and conspiracy for misappropriation of trade secrets.”81  
Thus, before proceeding, the court in this case concluded that the 
information at issue was, in fact, a trade secret; therefore, the 
information should be afforded legal protection because it had 
significant economic value to TRS.82
Ultimately, TRS elected to recover damages under tort remedies 
and the court awarded damages on the basis of conversion and 
conspiracy of $262,303.00 based upon the market value of the trade 
secrets.83  However, on appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the 
three former employees argued that the plain language of the Trade 
Secrets Act abrogated all other tort remedies.84  In order to determine 
whether the Trade Secret Act abrogated other tort remedies for 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 687. 
78. Id. 
79. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (2001). 
80. R.K. Enter., 158 S.W.3d at 687. 
81. Id. 
82. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 851.  This type of information would likely fall under 
the third category of information discussed in Part I.B above.  Further, trade secret 
information has competitive value and the court in this case seems to recognize the need to 
aggressively protect that value.  Id. 
83. R.K. Enter., 158 S.W.3d at 687-88. 
84. Id. at 688. 
  
2008]   TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 371 
 
 
misappropriation of trade secrets, the Arkansas Supreme Court used 
rules of statutory construction to construe the meaning of the statute.85  
The court also examined cases from other jurisdictions with similar 
statutory provisions.86  After its analysis, the court first determined that 
“courts [must] examine whether the claim [at issue] is based upon the 
misappropriation of a trade secret.”87  Because the court deemed the 
information at issue a trade secret, the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act 
applied in this case.88  Further, the court concluded that the “statutory 
language of the Trade Secret Act . . . preempt[ed] [or abrogated] the 
award of damages based upon tort claims for conversion of trade secrets 
. . . that may arise under a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.”89  
Thus, the court in this case eliminated the tort claims available to 
claimants for misappropriation of trade secrets.90  Ultimately, claimants 
may only seek damages for the misappropriation of trade secrets under 
the Trade Secrets Act in Arkansas.91  Courts in jurisdictions throughout 
the country have come to a similar conclusion.92
B.  Category Two Analysis 
The second category of cases highlights the true issue regarding 
claims based on the misuse of confidential information that does not 
meet the statutory definition of a trade secret, but that still derives 
economic value from not being readily known.93  Some courts have held 
that the UTSA does not abrogate civil remedies for claims regarding 
confidential information that does not rise to the level of a trade secret, 
85. Id. at 688-89. 
86. Id. at 689. 
87. Id. 
88. See id. at 690. 
89. Id. 
90. See id. 
91. See id.  Many other jurisdictions have also held that a claim under a state’s 
adoption of the UTSA is the only method of recovery allowed when seeking relief for 
misappropriation of a trade secret.  See Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 
N.W.2d 781, 792 n.10 (Wis. 2006). 
92. Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 33, n.45.  Similarly, these cases have found that the UTSA 
abrogates other civil tort remedies, making the UTSA the only avenue of recovery for 
claimants whose trade secrets have been misappropriated.  Id.  To hold otherwise would go 
against the purpose of the UTSA, which was to simplify trade secret protection.  UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531 (1979). 
93. See supra Part I.  This information includes both category two and category three 
information as described above.  However, the second category of information is more likely 
at issue because, often times, category three information will rise to the level of trade secret 
status.  Therefore, it would be protected only by the UTSA. 
  
372  MARQUETTE INTELLCTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol.12: 2 
 
 
while others have held that the UTSA was intended to abrogate such 
claims.94
In the first example of this category of cases, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin overturned the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and held that the 
UTSA does not abrogate all other civil remedies for the 
misappropriation of confidential information deemed not to be a trade 
secret.95  In Burbank Grease Services, L.L.C. v. Sokoloswski, the court 
sought to determine whether Wisconsin’s adoption of the UTSA,96 
abrogates all civil law remedies based on the misappropriation of 
confidential information that falls outside of the statutory definition of a 
trade secret. 97
Burbank involved a company called Burbank Grease Services 
(“Burbank”), which was in the “business of collecting and processing 
used restaurant fry grease, trap grease, and industrial grease.”98  This 
case arose after Larry Sokolowski (“Sokolowski”), one of Burbank’s 
employees, resigned from his position as a territory manager.99  As a 
territory manager, Sokolowski’s duties included overseeing sales 
personnel, managing customer relations, and preparing documents for 
Burbank’s accountant.100  When Burbank hired managers, the company 
distributed a “code of conduct” to the managers within its business.101  
The “code of conduct” provided guidelines regarding confidential 
information that it required its managers to follow.102  More specifically, 
Burbank’s “code of conduct” stated that “[n]o . . . employee shall 
disclose any confidential or privileged information to any person within 
the Company who does not have a need to know or to any outside 
individual or organization except as required in the normal course of 
business.”103  In general, to maintain its competitive advantage over rival 
companies, Burbank sought to identify and protect information that had 
94. See Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 792; see also Compuware Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
95. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 798. 
96. WIS. STAT. § 134.90 (2003-04). 
97. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d. at 785. 
98. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 785-86. 
99. Id. at 786. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. (alterations in original). 
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sufficient economic value such that competitors might have reason to 
attempt to obtain that information by improper means.104
Burbank employees also received an employee handbook providing 
that disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information could result 
in disciplinary action.105  The handbook also disclosed that employees 
may be required to sign a non-disclosure agreement.106  Sokolowski 
acknowledged in writing that he received and understood the provision 
regarding the non-disclosure agreement.107
In 2001, Sokolowski left Burbank and “signed an employment 
contract with United Liquid Waste Recycling, Inc. (‘United Liquid’).”108 
However, before Sokolowski resigned from Burbank, he accessed and 
took with him confidential information from Burbank’s computers.109  
Sokolowski took with him a list of Burbank’s grease trap customers, 
which included 2,400 names, phone numbers, addresses, “contact 
persons, total gallons for each grease trap, and the pricing Burbank had 
applied to each customer.”110  In addition, Sokolowski took a 
spreadsheet of Burbank’s industrial clients that showed the amount of 
grease collected from each customer, the fee Burbank paid that 
customer for the grease, as well as information regarding the amount of 
collections and revenues earned for certain Burbank drivers based on 
their pick-up routes.111  This type of confidential information that 
Burbank sought to protect provides an excellent illustration of the 
confidential information that does not rise to the level of a trade 
secret.112  Sokolowski knew that he took this information without 
Burbank’s permission and that Burbank considered all of the 
information confidential.113
104. Id. at 786 n.3; see Unikel, supra note 13, at 844-46.  This type of information would 
likely primarily include category two and three information.  See also discussion supra Part 
I.B. 
105. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 786. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 786-87. 
112. Id.; see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (1979).  
The most commonly accepted definition of a trade secret usually includes information 
classified as a “formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
process.”  Id.  Though the confidential business information at issue in Burbank could be a 
“compilation,” most courts and lay people tend to think of industry or business specific 
information as being a trade secret.  See Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 786-87. 
113. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 787. 
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Sokolowski used Burbank’s confidential information to solicit 
customers for United Liquid.114  When it became aware of Sokolowski’s 
actions, Burbank filed a suit claiming that Sokolowski “misappropriated 
Burbank’s trade secrets, breached his duty of loyalty to Burbank, 
intentionally interfered with Burbank’s business relationships, and 
committed computer crimes.”115  Because both the circuit court and the 
court of appeals agreed that Burbank’s confidential information did not 
meet the statutory definition of a trade secret, and because the courts 
concluded that Wisconsin’s adoption of the UTSA precluded all 
common law tort claims based on misappropriation of information 
deemed not to be a trade secret,116 the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment was granted.117  Burbank appealed the decision and the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review.118
In its analysis, the court used the common rules of statutory 
construction to determine the legislature’s meaning of Wisconsin 
Statute section 134.90(6), which is Wisconsin’s adoption of section seven 
of the UTSA.119  Burbank did not appeal the fact that the information 
Sokolowski took with him did not qualify as a trade secret.120  After 
analyzing the legislative history of the statute, court precedent, and 
three categories of cases from other states, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held that §134.90121 was meant to “leave available all other types 
of civil actions that do not depend on information that meets the 
statutory definition of a ‘trade secret.’”122  As a result, the court 
overturned the court of appeal’s decision by holding that any civil tort 
claim not based on the misappropriation of information deemed to be a 
trade secret remains available to Burbank.123
Thus, the court’s decision gave Burbank another avenue with which 
to pursue legal remedies against Sokolowski.  The result of this case, 
and cases decided similarly under each state’s adoption of the UTSA, 
114. Id.  This disclosure of the confidential information constitutes misappropriation 
under the UTSA.  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(2)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 
(1979). 
115. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 787. 
116. See WIS. STAT. § 134.90(6) (2005-06). 
117. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 787. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 788. 
120. Id. 
121. See WIS. STAT. § 134.90(6)(a). 
122. Burbank, 717 N.W.2d at 793. 
123. Id. at 793-94. 
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could have a detrimental effect on employees and their mobility.  
Outcomes such as that in Burbank further contribute to the current 
confusion of whether the UTSA, as adopted by the states, abrogates all 
other tort remedies for the misappropriation of confidential information 
that does not rise to the level of trade secret status. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, however, took a different perspective on this issue, holding 
that the UTSA does abrogate all other civil remedies for the 
misappropriation of information deemed not to be a trade secret.124
In Compuware Corp. v. International Business Machines, the 
defendant, International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”), 
developed and sold computer hardware, software, and services.125  “The 
plaintiff’s Compuware products at issue in its preliminary injunction 
motion were File-AID and Abend-AID,” which were “software tools 
that streamlined software applications for IBM’s” computers by 
“allowing programmers to easily” manage and edit data.126  Compuware 
had a solid reputation in this line of computer software. 
“In 1999, IBM developed a program called File Manager to compete 
with File-AID, and Fault Analyzer to compete with Abend-AID.”127  
IBM developed these tools at its Australian Programming Centre, 
where much of the code for the first version of IBM’s new products was 
taken from pre-existing IBM programs.128 Compuware claims that IBM 
used former Compuware employees and confidential information 
obtained from those former employees to develop the first version of 
IBM’s new competing products.129  As a result, Compuware sought 
damages for multiple claims including preliminary injunctive relief to 
stop what it described as theft of its proprietary information and trade 
secrets.130  In its analysis of the case, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan began its discussion of trade secret law by 
stating that “to prove misappropriation under the Michigan Uniform 
Trade Secret Act (“MUTSA”)131 Compuware must show that (1) it has 
124. Compuware Corp. v. IBM Corp., No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *8 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2003). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at *3. 
130. Id. at *1. 
131. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1901-1910 (West 2002). 
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protectable trade secrets, and (2) that IBM has improperly acquired, 
disclosed or used those trade secrets.”132
Though the court ultimately held that Compuware had not shown 
that it would suffer sufficient harm if the preliminary injunction was not 
granted,133 the court opined that Michigan’s adoption of the UTSA does, 
in fact, abrogate all other civil remedies.134  The court further stated that 
the “purpose of the UTSA was to ‘codify all the various common law 
tort remedies for theft of ideas’ and that ‘plaintiffs who believe their 
ideas were pilfered may resort only to the UTSA.’”135  Thus, by 
broadening the scope of Michigan’s adoption of the UTSA to be the 
sole remedy for the misappropriation of any business information that 
has some economic value to a company, the court in Compuware took 
nearly the opposite position as that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 
Burbank.136
C.  Category Three Analysis 
 The third category of cases necessary to consider when 
determining the impact of allowing additional or alternative tort claims 
based on the misappropriation of confidential information deemed not 
to be a trade secret involve those “claims [that are based] on misuse of 
confidential information, some of which meet the statutory definition of 
a trade secret and some of which do not.”137  Several courts in varying 
jurisdictions have held “that the UTSA abrogates claims only to the 
extent that they are based on a trade secret.”138  Separate claims based 
on other factual allegations—such as the misappropriation of 
information deemed not to be a trade secret—survive.139
 One example of such a case is AutoMed Technologies, Inc. v. 
Eller.140  Eller and Youngs were “high-level” employees with AutoMed 
Technologies (“AutoMed”), which designed automated medical 
132. Compuware, 2003 WL 23212863, at *8. 
133. Id. at *10. 
134. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1908(1); see also Compuware, 2003 WL 23212863, 
at *8. 
135. Compuware, 2003 WL 23212863 at *8 (quoting Clearing Niagara, Inc. v. Midwest 
Brake Bond Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (W.D. Mich. 2003). 
136. See id.; Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 798 (Wis. 
2006). 
137. Id. at 792-93. 
138. Id. at 793. 
139. Id. 
140. AutoMed Technologies, Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
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dispensing systems.141  Eller originally worked for a company that 
eventually became Healthcare Corp. (“Baxter”); however, Baxter sold 
the business division that Eller worked in, along with “certain 
intellectual property and trade secret rights, to AutoMed.”142  The “asset 
purchase agreement” that enabled this business transaction also 
“assigned Baxter’s rights under any confidentiality and non-compete 
agreements with the division’s employees and third party 
subcontractors.”143
Eller continued to work in the same division, despite the fact that 
Baxter was sold to AutoMed; and eventually, in 1999, he signed an 
employment agreement with AutoMed.144  However, he never signed 
the company’s non-competition and non-disclosure agreements.145  
Youngs, the other employee mentioned in the suit, also signed an 
employment agreement with AutoMed.  However, he did sign his non-
competition and non-disclosure agreement.146
Eller, Youngs, and Sun Design, a subcontractor originally hired to 
work with AutoMed, eventually terminated their employment with 
AutoMed and began working for Express Scripts.147  In the course of 
their new employment, Eller, Youngs, and Sun Design continued to 
work on a project they had started while working at AutoMed.148  Thus, 
AutoMed brought a suit against Eller, Youngs, and Sun Design for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and breach of 
fiduciary duty.149
In its analysis, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois concluded that some of the information AutoMed alleged the 
defendants took did qualify as trade secrets; therefore, the Illinois Trade 
Secrets Act150 provided the exclusive remedy for those claims.151  
However, the court also allowed AutoMed to pursue two breach of 
fiduciary duty claims against its former employees because, in their 
plotting to leave the company, the employees misused confidential 
141. Id. at 919. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 919-20. 
147. Id. at 920. 
148. Id. 
149. See id. at 919. 
150. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/1-9 (West 2001). 
151. AutoMed, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 921. 
  
378  MARQUETTE INTELLCTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol.12: 2 
 
 
information not deemed to be a trade secret.152  Thus, as this case points 
out, courts often take the time to scrutinize the type of material claimed 
to be a trade secret when determining what types of claims employers 
may bring against former employees.  This analysis seems to favor the 
interests of the employer over the employee because the employees in 
this suit were, if found guilty of the alleged claims, subject to multiple 
punishments under multiple theories of liability. 
III.  BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS 
“The underlying jurisprudence behind trade secret protection is that 
an owner should have a remedy if the essential element of secrecy is lost 
due to a breach of confidence by someone obligated to keep [the] 
information secret.”153  Before determining the most appropriate 
interpretation of section seven of the UTSA, courts and legislatures 
need to consider the public policy implications of the various 
interpretations of section seven.  Often, competing businesses, 
employers, and mobile employees have competing interests.154  How a 
court interprets section seven of the UTSA may affect businesses, 
employers, and employees differently. 
In order to maintain a competitive advantage, businesses should be 
able to protect confidential information that is valuable to their 
business.  In many industries, certain confidential information is 
economically necessary to the viability of a business.155  As a result of 
the “tremendous economic advantages that exclusive knowledge . . . 
affords to companies in highly competitive industries,” there is a great 
deal of incentive for competing businesses to acquire that confidential 
information.156  Because the incentives for obtaining confidential 
information can be so great, businesses and individuals have used 
improper means to acquire or use that valuable information.157  Thus, 
courts and legislatures should interpret the UTSA in a manner that 
promotes the policy behind the UTSA, which is to work to “eliminate or 
. . . minimize the incentives to obtain competitively valuable information 
through corrupt practices, rather than through independent effort.”158
152. See id. at 921-22. 
153. Rustad, supra note 39, at 508. 
154. Unikel, supra note 13, at 845-51. 
155. See id. at 845-46. 
156. Id. 
157. Id.; see cases discussed supra Part II. 
158. Unikel, supra note 13, at 846. 
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However, the level of protection afforded to confidential 
information needs to be further balanced against the policy of 
promoting innovation and encouraging invention.159  If too much 
confidential information is protected, or information that is too widely 
known is protected, competitive businesses and industries will be 
prevented from using that information to innovate and generating new 
technological and business advances.160  On the contrary, however, 
without legal protection for valuable, confidential, independently-
discovered information, businesses would have little incentive to create 
new technology and innovation because there would be no guarantee 
that its discoveries would be protected from theft.161  This outcome 
might mean either (1) companies would simply stop trying to innovate, 
or (2) companies would invest so much money in protecting their 
confidential information that they would have little money left over for 
the development of new technology.162
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, courts need to consider the 
interests of employees, namely, departing employees.163  In the situation 
involving departing employees and trade secrets or confidential 
information deemed not to be a trade secret, courts have consistently 
held that there is value in protecting both types of information.164  In 
states such as California, departing employees are often involved in 
trade secret lawsuits as a result of using certain information obtained 
from a former job while subsequently employed by a competing 
business.165  In such cases, businesses seek to hold former employees 
liable for using confidential information deemed not to be a trade 
secret, and former employers often try to claim damages under a variety 
of tort law claims.166  This type of litigation, however, can have a 
negative impact on employee mobility.  If employers continue to restrict 
the use of confidential information not deemed to be a trade secret by 
suing former employees under tort claims for use of information, then 
employees might become less likely to take new positions in similar 
industries for fear of inevitable litigation.  Also, allowing companies to 
bring tort claims against departing employees for using confidential 
159. Id. at 846-49. 
160. See id. at 849-50. 
161. Id. at 847-49. 
162. Id. 
163. See Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 9. 
164. See cases discussed supra Part II. 
165. See Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 9. 
166. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10; see also cases discussed supra Part II. 
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information not deemed to be a trade secret essentially allows 
employers the ability to enforce implied post-employment covenants.  
This result decreases the incentive for employers to implement 
confidentiality agreements while an employee is actually employed, and 
leaves an employee with little guidance regarding what information is 
acceptable information to take and use in a new position. 
Recognizing these dangers, states such as California have used its 
Business and Professions Code to explicitly support employee mobility 
within a given job market.167  According to Attorney Tait Graves, 
“[f]ederal courts applying California law have also used section 16600 
[of the Business and Professions Code] to void restrictive post-
employment covenants.”168  Therefore, when determining whether the 
UTSA abrogates other tort law claims for suits involving confidential 
information deemed not to be a trade secret, courts and legislatures 
need to consider the interests of departing employees. 
IV. HOW TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION NOT DEEMED 
TO BE A TRADE SECRET UNDER THE UTSA 
Upon balancing the interests of employers, employees, and 
competitive businesses, the most efficient and fair interpretation of the 
current version of the UTSA is that it does, or should, abrogate all other 
civil remedies for the misappropriation of confidential information 
deemed not to be a trade secret.169  Further, the courts should look 
seriously into moving away from the rigid definition of a trade secret 
and instead, seek to define information according to the categories set 
forth in Part I.B. 
If courts adopt this view, they would essentially be holding that:  “(1) 
the only mechanism available for the protection of . . . [confidential 
information] is an action under a state’s trade secret act; and, (2) that 
common-law theories pertaining exclusively to the protection of trade 
secrets or confidential information are . . . preempted [or abrogated].”170  
This interpretation of the UTSA is more efficient and effective than the 
other competing theories. Holding that the UTSA only applies to 
information that is “legally” defined as a trade secret or holding that 
misappropriation of trade secrets or confidential information can be 
protected by any legal theory and ignoring the UTSA all together, 
167. Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 9; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997). 
168. Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 11. 
169. See Unikel, supra note 13, at 886-88. 
170. Id. at 886. 
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“reduce[s] the UTSA to just another basis for recovery and leave[s] 
prior law . . . untouched.”171  Essentially, any other interpretation 
renders the UTSA mostly ineffective.  If courts perpetuate the notion 
that the UTSA does not abrogate other tort claims for the misuse of 
information not deemed to be a trade secret, the policy behind the 
UTSA—to eliminate the uncertainty associated with trade secret 
protection—will fall away and the law existing at the outer bounds of 
trade secret law will be no more clear today than it was when the UTSA 
was enacted. 
The interpretation that the UTSA abrogates all other civil tort 
remedies for the misuse of confidential information deemed not to be a 
trade secret also effectively protects the interests of businesses, 
competing businesses, and departing employees. 
The interests of businesses seeking to protect confidential 
information not deemed to be a trade secret would be given even 
stronger protection under this interpretation of the UTSA.  In order to 
afford companies the greatest degree of protection, it is imperative for 
courts to protect both trade secrets and confidential information that 
does not rise to the level of a trade secret in a similar manner.  Often 
times, there is no distinction in the relative value between these types of 
information to a business.172  A chemical formula, for example, may be 
just as valuable as confidential customer lists, which may not be a trade 
secret.  As such, given the importance of such information, the UTSA 
should protect confidential information deemed not to be a trade secret 
and abrogate other civil tort remedies.  This approach allows businesses 
to efficiently bring suits under the UTSA for misappropriation of a 
variety of types of information.  This approach would also, in turn, 
reduce litigation costs and eliminate some of the uncertainty 
surrounding protection of confidential information.  Also, as stated in 
the UTSA, contract claims would still be available to businesses in the 
event that a departing employee violates a confidentiality or 
employment agreement. 
Had the court in Burbank affirmed the appeals court’s decision by 
holding that the UTSA does protect confidential information, it would 
have further effectuated the underlying purpose of the UTSA—that is, 
to promote uniformity in this area of law.  Instead, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court only added to the confusion that already exists and 
171. Unikel, supra note 13, at 888. 
172. See supra Part I.B. 
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undermined the intent of the drafters of the UTSA to truly create a 
uniform law among the states.173
Further, if courts find that the UTSA abrogates other tort claims for 
misappropriation of confidential information deemed not to be a trade 
secret, competing businesses will be even less likely to misappropriate 
any type of confidential information.  This bright line approach would 
further minimize the incentive to steal confidential information from 
competing businesses because the law would be clear regarding how a 
court should handle misappropriation claims.  Thus, clarifying the law 
would only further discourage competitors from stealing confidential 
information. 
Finally, though the idea may be counterintuitive, holding that the 
UTSA does abrogate all other tort remedies for the misuse of 
confidential information deemed not to be a trade secret does effectuate 
the best interests of departing employees.  By holding that the UTSA 
does not abrogate alternative tort actions for misappropriation of 
information that is deemed “confidential but not a trade secret,”174 
employers are able to hold former employees liable for using 
information not deemed to be a trade secret under a variety of legal 
theories.175  This tactic on the part of former employers seems to “us[e] 
tort law to create an implied non[-]competition contract with the 
departing employee.”176  As a result, employees are vulnerable to 
multiple claims with unknown outcomes.  By eliminating the 
ambiguities associated with the UTSA, courts can give departing 
employees a body of law that clarifies what it is that a departing 
employee can and cannot do with respect to confidential information 
that does not rise to the level of a trade secret.  This would also limit the 
damages that a court could award to those claims allowed under the 
UTSA.  Because this outcome may limit the damages an employer could 
receive, employers might be more likely to implement employee 
confidentiality agreements to avoid litigation. 
By clarifying this information, employees such as Sokolowski in 
Burbank would at least be more likely to know the consequences of 
173. See Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 794, 799-803 
(Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
174. Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 10. 
175. Id.  Relief can be sought by an employer under theories such as breach of 
contract, interference with contractual relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair 
competition, to name a few.  See Unikel, supra note 13, at 890.  See also Graves, supra note 8, 
¶¶ 46-54. 
176. Graves, supra note 8, ¶ 10. 
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misusing information.  Clarifying the law with respect to employee 
liability for misuse of confidential information will presumably make it 
easier to educate departing employees about their responsibilities as a 
departing employee.  As a result, employees will be less likely to be 
hesitant to leave a job and will continue to remain mobile in the market, 
therefore, perpetuating the public policy supporting employee mobility. 
CONCLUSION 
At this juncture, perhaps the NCCUSL should be prompted to make 
additional amendments, that either (1) explicitly interpret the meaning 
of section seven of the UTSA as it is currently drafted, or (2) add 
provisions to the UTSA that define confidential information deemed 
not to be a trade secret.  If the Commission does not make these 
suggested changes, then the necessary changes and clarifications will be 
up to the state legislatures.  However, legislatures may never implement 
these changes.  Therefore, it is up to the respective state courts to keep 
in mind the policies underlying the UTSA’s enactment, as well as the 
interests of those businesses and employees who are relying on the 
courts to provide cost-effective and predictable remedies for those 
businesses whose confidential information is misappropriated.  By 
holding that the UTSA does abrogate all other civil remedies for 
information deemed not to be a trade secret, courts have the ability to 
provide much needed stability to the current body of trade secret law. 
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